Implementing conjunction obfuscation under entropic ring LWE by Cousins, David Bruce et al.
Implementing Conjunction Obfuscation under
Entropic Ring LWE
David Bruce Cousins∗, Giovanni Di Crescenzo†, Kamil Doruk Gu¨r‡, Kevin King§,
Yuriy Polyakov‡‖, Kurt Rohloff‡‖, Gerard W. Ryan‡ and Erkay Savas¸†¶
∗ Raytheon BBN Technologies, dave.cousins@raytheon.com
† Applied Communication Sciences / Vencore Labs, gdicrescenzo@vencorelabs.com
‡ NJIT Cybersecurity Research Center, New Jersey Institute of Technology,
{kg365,polyakov,rohloff,gwryan}@njit.edu
§ Massachusetts Institute of Technology, kcking@mit.edu
¶ Sabancı University, erkays@sabanciuniv.edu
‖ Corresponding Authors
Abstract—We address the practicality challenges of secure
program obfuscation by implementing, optimizing, and experi-
mentally assessing an approach to securely obfuscate conjunction
programs proposed in [1]. Conjunction programs evaluate func-
tions f (x1, . . . , xL) =
∧
i∈I yi, where yi is either xi or ¬xi and
I ⊆ [L], and can be used as classiﬁers. Our obfuscation approach
satisﬁes distributional Virtual Black Box (VBB) security based
on reasonable hardness assumptions, namely an entropic variant
of the Ring Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE) assumption. Prior
implementations of secure program obfuscation techniques sup-
port either trivial programs like point functions, or support the
obfuscation of more general but less efﬁcient branching programs
to satisfy Indistinguishability Obfuscation (IO), a weaker security
model. Further, the more general implemented techniques, rather
than relying on standard assumptions, base their security on
conjectures that have been shown to be theoretically vulnerable.
Our work is the ﬁrst implementation of non-trivial program
obfuscation based on polynomial rings. Our contributions in-
clude multiple design and implementation advances resulting
in reduced program size, obfuscation runtime, and evaluation
runtime by many orders of magnitude. We implement our
design in software and experimentally assess performance in
a commercially available multi-core computing environment.
Our implementation achieves runtimes of 6.7 hours to securely
obfuscate a 64-bit conjunction program and 2.5 seconds to
evaluate this program over an arbitrary input. We are also
able to obfuscate a 32-bit conjunction program with 53 bits of
security in 7 minutes and evaluate the obfuscated program in 43
milliseconds on a commodity desktop computer, which implies
that 32-bit conjunction obfuscation is already practical. Our
graph-induced (directed) encoding implementation runs up to 25
levels, which is higher than previously reported in the literature
for this encoding. Our design and implementation advances are
applicable to obfuscating more general compute-and-compare
programs and can also be used for many cryptographic schemes
based on lattice trapdoors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Program obfuscation has long been of interest in the cyber-
security community. Obfuscated programs should be difﬁcult
to reverse engineer, and should protect intellectual property
contained in software from theft. This prevents the identiﬁca-
tion of exploits usable by adversaries.
For many years practical program obfuscation techniques
have been heuristic and have not provided secure approaches to
obfuscation based on the computational hardness of mathemat-
ical problems, similar to how cryptography has provided data
security based on the computational hardness assumptions.
Prior techniques are discussed in [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7].
Although often usable in practice, these prior approaches
do not provide strong security guarantees, and can often be
defeated without large computational effort. For example, [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12] all provide methods to defeat heuristic
software obfuscation.
There have been multiple recent attempts to develop cryp-
tographically secure approaches to program obfuscation based
on the computational hardness of mathematical problems. See
[13] for a survey of these recent approaches. There are multiple
deﬁnitions used for obfuscation in these recent approaches.
Two prominent deﬁnitions are Virtual Black Box (VBB) and
Indistinguishability Obfuscation (IO).
Virtual Black Box (VBB) obfuscation is an intuitive def-
inition of secure program obfuscation where the obfuscated
program reveals nothing more than black-box access to the
program via an oracle [14]. VBB is known to have strong
limitations [15], [16], [17]. The most signiﬁcant limitation is
that general-purpose VBB obfuscation is unachievable [15].
To address limitations of VBB, Barak et al. [15] deﬁne
a weaker security notion of Indistinguishability Obfuscation
(IO) for general-purpose program obfuscation. IO requires
that the obfuscations of any two circuits (programs) of the
same size and same functionality (namely, the same truth
table) are computationally indistinguishable. The IO concept
has been of recent interest, with recent advances to identify
candidate IO constructions based on multi-linear maps [18],
[19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]. There has also been recent
work to implement multi-linear map constructions [25], [26],
[27]. Recent results show that these constructions might not
be secure [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36].
The only IO construction supporting general functions that
is not subject to any attack to date is the work by Garg et
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al. [37]. These cryptographically secure program obfuscation
capabilities have also been considered impractical due to their
computational inefﬁciency.
There have been attempts to securely obfuscate special-
purpose functions, such as point, conjunction, and evasive
functions, using potentially practical techniques. For example,
there have been several approaches to obfuscating point func-
tions [38], [39], [40], [41], [42]. Unfortunately, point functions
have limited applicability.
We address the practicality challenges of secure program
obfuscation by implementing, optimizing, and experimentally
evaluating an approach proposed in [1] to securely obfus-
cate programs that execute conjunction functions, which are
signiﬁcantly more complex than point functions. Conjunction
programs evaluate functions f (x1, . . . , xL) =
∧
i∈I yi, where
yi is either xi or ¬xi and I ⊆ [L].
The obfuscation of conjunction programs is explored in
[43] using the graded-encoding (multi-linear map) candidate
construction from [20]. This prior approach is modiﬁed for an
approach that is based on a graph-induced multi-linear map
construction in [21] and secure under an entropic variant of
the Ring-LWE assumption [1]. The obfuscation scheme satis-
ﬁes distributional VBB security, meaning that the obfuscated
program reveals nothing more than black-box access to the
conjunction function via an oracle, as long as the conjunction
is chosen from a distribution having sufﬁcient entropy. The
original work [1] focused on theoretical feasibility of con-
junction obfuscation under entropic Ring-LWE and did not
examine practicality issues of the construction.
To address the practicality of obfuscating conjunction pro-
grams, we introduce major design and system-level improve-
ments compared to [1] that enable obfuscation and evaluation
procedures both in server and desktop computing environ-
ments. These improvements include the use of optimized
Gaussian sampling for lattice trapdoors and arbitrary-base
gadget matrix, word-based encoding of programs (instead of
binary encoding), optimized correctness constraint and param-
eter selection, efﬁcient polynomial multiplication in double
Chinese Remainder Transform (CRT) representation, opti-
mized matrix arithmetic, and loop parallelization at multiple
levels of the implementation. We implement this scheme in a
C++ cryptographic library with multi-threading support.
Our implementation achieves runtimes of 6.7 hours to
securely obfuscate a 64-bit conjunction program, and 2.5
sec. to evaluate this program over an arbitrary input in a
server computing environment. The obfuscated program size
is about 750 GB. For a 32-bit conjunction program, we
report the obfuscation runtime of 7.0 min. and evaluation
runtime of 43ms in a desktop computing environment, with
the obfuscated program size under 6 GB.
A. Our Contributions
We implement the conjunction obfuscator on top of PAL-
ISADE1, an open-source lattice cryptography library. We add
new modules in PALISADE including the following:
1https://git.njit.edu/palisade/PALISADE
1) Gaussian lattice trapdoor sampler for power-of-two
cyclotomic rings. This implementation supports arbitrary
moduli, including primes and products of primes, and
performs all computations without explicit generation of
a Cholesky decomposition matrix, which was a bottleneck
of previous implementations based on [44]. Our imple-
mentation also supports a gadget matrix with an arbitrary
base, which is computationally and spatially much more
efﬁcient than the classical binary gadget matrix.
2) Generic integer Gaussian samplers, including recent
Karney’s rejection [45] and constant-time [46] samplers.
These samplers can be used for any integer Gaussian
sampling operation in lattice-based cryptography.
3) Implementation of directed encoding, a special case of
GGH15 multi-linear map construction.
4) Extended Double-CRT support to perform trapdoor
sampling and obfuscation-related operations using native
integer data types.
5) Efﬁcient matrix arithmetic to support fast evaluation of
inputs using the obfuscated conjunction program.
6) Multi-threading and loop parallelization support for all
operations of conjunction obfuscator and certain lower-
level matrix operations.
Our implementation includes several major original design
improvements of the obfuscation scheme [1]:
1) Word encoding of conjunction program compared to the
binary alphabet used in [1], which results in the reduction
of obfuscated program size and obfuscation/evaluation
runtimes by many orders of magnitude.
2) Efﬁcient ring-based trapdoor construction and preim-
age sampling, which substantially reduces the obfusca-
tion runtime and storage requirements.
3) Dramatically reduced dimensions of encoding matri-
ces due to the use of a gadget matrix with a large base,
which allow us to reduce program size and obfusca-
tion/evaluation runtimes by multiple orders of magnitude.
4) Improved bounds on parameters coming from more
careful analysis of the matrix/polynomial products and
use of the Central Limit Theorem.
B. Related Work
Prior implementation work on secure program obfuscation
beyond point obfuscation includes [25], [26], [27].
The ﬁrst imlementation attempt [25] is based on the CLT13
encoding [47]. The authors build a branching program (BP)
that obfuscates point functions. The obfuscation time for a 14-
bit point function and 60-bit security is 9 hours, the program
size is 31 GB and the evaluation of a single input takes
3.3 hours. Better results are reported in [26] which shows a
framework for BP obfuscation using both CLT13 and GGH13
[48] multi-linear map encodings. The obfuscation time for an
80-bit point function using CLT13 with 80-bit security is 3.3
hours, obfuscated program size is 8.3 GB and evaluation time
is 180 seconds. Note that the above two studies implement
multi-linear map constructions to IO not believed to be secure
[28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33].
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Halevi et al. [27] present an implementation of a simpliﬁed
variant of GGH15 [21] to obfuscate oblivious read-once BPs,
i.e., nondeterministic ﬁnite automata, of at most 80 bits
with over 100 states. The GGH15 encoding is more efﬁcient
than CLT13 and GGH13 for larger numbers of states (over
approximately 50 states), and presently appears to be immune
to existing attacks in the obfuscation scenarios. Obfuscation
takes 23 days, obfuscated program size is 9 TB, and evaluation
takes 25 min. The maximum BP length is 20.
Our implementation is based on GGH15 [21] and entropic
Ring-LWE, which is different from [25], [26]. We use a
different security model for the obfuscation of a special-
purpose function satisfying distributional VBB security, rather
than BP obfuscation satisfying IO. Hence, results can be
compared only indirectly. The results of this comparison are:
1) Our evaluation time for a 64-bit conjunction program
(2.5 seconds), which is often the main runtime metric
when assessing the practicability of program obfuscation,
is signiﬁcantly smaller than the one reported in [27] for
the same bit length (949 seconds) and is smaller than the
runtime for an 80-bit point function with 80-bit security
in [26] (180 seconds).
2) Our evaluation time for 20 levels of directed encoding
for binary alphabet (188 seconds) is also smaller than the
corresponding evaluation time in [27] (1514 seconds).
3) Our obfuscation time for a 64-bit pattern is 6.7 hours vs.
87 hours in [27].
4) The number of states supported by the conjunction ob-
fuscator can be much higher than 100 (which is larger
than in [25], [26], [27]) and is an exponential function of
the number of “wildcards” in the conjunction pattern.
5) Our conjunction obfuscation does not include any ran-
domizing as in BP obfuscation and, hence, requires the
conjunction pattern to have high entropy to be VBB-
secure, which is a drawback of our approach.
Although we take a software-only-based approach to pro-
gram obfuscation, hardware-based approaches are also feasi-
ble. The work [49] achieves simulation-secure obfuscation for
RAM programs using secure hardware to circumvent previous
impossibility results.
There are related efforts to provide designs and implemen-
tations of obfuscation capabilities. Many building blocks of
our implementation can be used to obfuscate compute-and-
compare programs, a generalization of conjunctions, using the
recently proposed construction based on LWE [50]. Another
similar generalization is lockable obfuscation [51]. These more
general constructions have not been implemented yet.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II provides the preliminaries of conjunction programs and
lattices. Section III describes the conjunction obfuscator un-
der entropic Ring-LWE and introduces our word encoding
optimization. Section IV presents our optimizations of lattice
trapdoor sampling focusing on the G-lattice generalization to
arbitrary bases. Section V discusses the selection of parameters
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Fig. 1: Sample conjunction program that accepts [01].
to optimize program size and runtimes. Section VI discusses
our algorithms for efﬁcient polynomial and matrix operations.
Sections VII and VIII provide implementation details and
performance evaluation of conjunction obfuscator. The paper
concludes in Section IX. Appendices provide pseudocode for
trapdoor sampling and conjunction obfuscation procedures,
experimental results for integer Gaussian sampling, and deriva-
tion details.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Conjunction Programs and Their Applications
We deﬁne a conjunction as a function on L-bit inputs,
speciﬁed as f (x1, . . . , xL) =
∧
i∈I yi, where yi is either xi
or ¬xi and I ⊆ [L]. The conjunction program checks that
the values xi : i ∈ I match some ﬁxed pattern while the
values with indices outside I can be arbitrary. We represent
conjunctions further in the paper as vectors v ∈ {0, 1, }L,
where we deﬁne Fv (x1, . . . , xL) = 1 iff for all i ∈ [L] we
have xi = vi or vi = . We refer to  as a “wildcard”.
Conjunctions are used in machine learning to execute or
approximate classes of classiﬁers [52], [53]. We can repre-
sent linear classiﬁers as conjunction programs, and we have
used obfuscated conjunction programs to support Optical
Character Recognition (OCR) applications on the standard
MNIST dataset, for example, [54]. In this application, we use
principal component analysis (PCA) techniques to construct
a hypercube linear classiﬁer for speciﬁc characters that we
obfuscate using our conjunction obfuscation technique.
Figure 1 shows a sample conjunction program represented
as the accepting language of a ﬁnite state machine where
binary inputs drive state transitions. In this example the
program accepts the input string [01], where  represents a
“wildcard input”. This program accepts all 4-bit strings where
the ﬁrst bit is a 0 and the third bit is a 1. The second and
fourth bits in the program are wildcards, meaning either 0 or
1 inputs in these locations can lead to accepting states.
We discuss below how one can group bits into larger
alphabets of inputs using word encoding and we are not bound
to binary inputs for conjunction programs. With these larger
encodings, conjunction programs can be used to represent
L∞-norm and hypercube description region classiﬁers, among
others [55], [56].
B. Cyclotomic Rings
Our implementation utilizes cyclotomic polynomial rings
R = Z[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉 and Rq = Zq[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉, where n
is a power of 2 and q is an integer modulus. The order of
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cyclotomic polynomial Φmˆ(x) = xn + 1 is mˆ = 2n. The
modulus q is chosen to satisfy q ≡ 1 mod mˆ. The elements
in these rings can be expressed in coefﬁcient or evaluation
representation. The coefﬁcient representation of polynomial
a(x) =
∑
i<n aix
i treats the polynomial as a list of all
coefﬁcients a = 〈a0, a1, . . . , an−1〉 ∈ (Z/qZ)n. The evalu-
ation representation, also referred to as polynomial Chinese
Remainder Transform (CRT) representation [57], computes the
values of polynomial a(x) at all primitive mˆ-th roots of unity
modulo q, i.e., bi = a(ζi) mod q for i ∈ (Z/mˆZ)∗. These
cyclotomic rings support fast polynomial multiplication by
transforming the polynomials from coefﬁcient to evaluation
representation in O(n log n) time using Fermat Theoretic
Transform (FTT) [58] and component-wise multiplication.
Lattice sampling works with n-dimensional discrete Gaus-
sian distributions over lattice Λ ⊂ Rn denoted as DΛ,c,σ ,
where c ∈ Rn is the center and σ is the distribution parameter.
At the most primitive level, the lattice sampling algorithms
work with discrete Gaussian distribution DZ,c,σ over integers
with ﬂoating-point center c and distribution parameter σ. If
the center c is omitted, it is assumed to be set to zero. When
discrete Gaussian sampling is applied to cyclotomic rings, we
denote discrete Gaussian distribution as DR,σ .
We use Uq to denote discrete uniform distribution over Zq
and Rq . T denotes discrete ternary uniform distribution over
{−1, 0, 1}n. We deﬁne k = log2 q	 as the number of bits
required to represent integers in Zq .
C. Cyclotomic Fields
The perturbation generation procedure in trapdoor sampling
also utilizes cyclotomic ﬁelds K2n = Q[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉, which
are similar in their properties to the cyclotomic rings except
that the coefﬁcients/values of the polynomials are rationals
rather than integers. The elements of the cyclotomic ﬁelds
also have coefﬁcient and evaluation (CRT) representation, and
support fast polynomial multiplication using variants of the
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The evaluation representation
of such rational polynomials in our implementation works with
complex primitive roots of unity rather than the modular ones.
D. Double-CRT Representation
Our implementation utilizes the Chinese Remainder The-
orem (referred to as integer CRT) representation to break
multi-precision integers in Zq into vectors of smaller integers
to perform operations efﬁciently using native (64-bit) integer
types. We use a chain of same-size prime moduli q0, q1, q2, . . .
satisifying qi ≡ 1 mod mˆ. Here, the modulus q is computed
as
∏l−1
i=0 qi, where l is the number of prime moduli needed
to represent q. All polynomial multiplications are performed
on ring elements in polynomial CRT representation where
all integer components are represented in the integer CRT
basis. Using the notation proposed in [59], we refer to this
representation of polynomials as “Double-CRT”.
E. Ring Learning with Errors Problem
Our scheme is based on a special case of the Ring-LWE
problem [60] introduced in Deﬁnition 1. Let us deﬁne an
operator MakePoly such that for all rings R, if a ∈ Rn, then
MakePoly (a) ∈ R[x] is the polynomial whose coefﬁcients
are the elements of a. If D is a distribution over Rn, then
MakePoly(D) is the respective distribution over R[x].
Deﬁnition 1 (PLWEn,m,q,χ). Let n be a power of two,
and let R = Z[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉. Let q = 2ω(log λ), where λ is a
security parameter, be such that q ≡ 1 (mod 2n) and deﬁne
Rq = R/qR. Let m ∈ N and let χ be a distribution over
the integers. The PLWEn,m,q,χ problem is the problem of
distinguishing
{(ai, ai · s+ ei (mod xn + 1, q))}i∈[m] from {(ai, ui)}i∈[m],
where s, ei ← MakePoly (χn) and ai, ui ←
MakePoly
(
Znq
)
.
In our implementation, we also use a modiﬁcation of
Deﬁnition 1 where s ← MakePoly (T ). This variant is often
referred to as a small-secret case of Ring-LWE.
Prior to deﬁning the entropic variant of the PLWEn,m,q,χ
problem, we introduce H˜∞ (X|Z) as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Average Min-Entropy). Let X and Z be (possi-
bly dependent) random variables, the average min-entropy of
X conditioned on Z is
H˜∞ (X|Z) = − log
(
E
z←Z
[
2−H∞(X|Z=z)
])
,
where H∞ (Y ) is the min-entropy of random variable Y .
Conceptually the min-entropy is the smallest of the Re´nyi
family of entropies, which corresponds to the most conser-
vative way of measuring the unpredictability of a set of
outcomes. In this case, we deal with its averaged expression.
The entropic version of the PLWEn,m,q,χ problem is
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 (α-Entropic PLWEn,m,q,χ). Let m,n, q, χ be
parameters of λ and Rq as in Deﬁnition 1, and let D =
{Dλ} be an efﬁciently samplable distribution with (x, z) ←
Dλ having x ∈ {0, 1} for some  = (λ) and H˜∞ (x|z) ≥
α(λ). The α-entropic PLWEn,m,q,χ problem is to distinguish(
{sj}j∈[] , z, {(ai, ai · s+ ei)}i∈[m]
)
from (
{sj}j∈[] , z, {(ai, ui)}i∈[m]
)
,
where sj , ei ← MakePoly (χn), s =
∏
j∈[] s
xj
j , and
ai, ui ← MakePoly
(
Znq
)
.
In our implementation, we use a modiﬁcation of Deﬁnition
3 where sj ← MakePoly (T ). This variant will be referred
to as a small-secret case of entropic Ring-LWE.
III. CONJUNCTION OBFUSCATOR
A. Overview
We ﬁrst formulate the abstract conjunction obfuscator using
the deﬁnition developed in [43].
To obfuscate a conjunction Fv with v ∈ {0, 1, }L, we
perform the following steps:
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• Choose random short ring elements
{si,b, ri,b : i ∈ [L], b ∈ {0, 1}} subject to si,0 = si,1 if
vi = .
• Create encodings Ri,b of ri,b and encodings Si,b of si,b ·
ri,b under Ai−1 → Ai (the speciﬁc encoding technique
used in our implementation is described in III-B).
• Choose a random short ring element rL+1. Create
an encoding RL+1 of rL+1 and encoding SL+1 of
rL+1
∏L
i=1 si,vi . These encodings are under AL →
AL+1.
We set the obfuscated program to be
Πv =
(
A0, {Si,b,Ri,b}i∈[L],b∈{0,1} ,RL+1,SL+1
)
.
To evaluate
∏
v on an input x ∈ {0, 1}L, we compute
S∗ =
(
L∏
i=1
Si,xi
)
RL+1 , R
∗ =
(
L∏
i=1
Ri,xi
)
SL+1.
If Fv = 1, then both S∗ and R∗ are encodings of the same
value rL+1
∏L
i=1 si,vi under A0 → AL+1, and if Fv = 0, then
S∗ and R∗ are extremely unlikely to encode the same value,
i.e., the probability of this event is negl (λ). Therefore, we can
compute the output of the program by testing the equality of
encoded values using EqualTestA0→AL+1 (S
∗,R∗).
B. Ring Instantiation of Directed Encoding
We implement an instantiation of conjunction obfuscator
based on a directed encoding scheme, which is a special
case of GGH15 graph-induced multi-linear maps [21], spe-
cialized to a line. The ring instantiation of the directed
encoding scheme for the case of cyclotomic rings Rq =
Zq[x]/ 〈xn + 1〉, which was originally proposed in [1], is
described below:
• KeyGen
(
1λ, 1d
)
takes as input a security parameter λ and
upper bound d on the number of levels, runs lattice trapdoor
generation algorithm TrapGen
(
1λ
)
(deﬁned in Algorithm
1) and outputs
(PKi,EKi) = (Ai,Ti) ∈ Rq1×m ×Rm×κ,
where i ∈ {0, . . . , d} and m and κ are two trapdoor-related
parameters explained in Section IV.
• EncodeAi→Ai+1 (Ti, r), where r ∈ R, is performed in two
steps
– Compute bi+1 := rAi+1 + ei+1 ∈ Rq1×m, where
ei+1 ← DR1×m,σ .
– Output a matrix
Ri+1 ← GaussSamp (Ai,Ti,bi+1, σt, s) ∈ Rm×m,
where GaussSamp is the preimage sampling algorithm
discussed in Section IV and σt and s are distribution
parameters deﬁned in Section V-A.
Note that AiRi+1 = bi+1 = rAi+1 + ei+1 ∈ Rq1×m.
• REncodeAi→Ai+1
(
1λ
)
is the public encoding procedure
that simply samples a matrix Ri+1 ← DRm×m,σ .
• Mult (R1,R2) = R1R2, where multiplication is performed
over Rq .
• EqualTestA0→Ai (R1,R2) outputs 1 for “accept” if
‖A0 (R1 −R2)‖∞ ≤ q/8
and 0 for “reject” otherwise. Note that this procedure does
not depend on any Ai, where i > 0.
The correctness of the encoding scheme is shown in [1].
C. Word Encoding Optimization
The original conjunction obfuscation design of [1] uses one
level for each bit in pattern v ∈ {0, 1, }L. Our ﬁrst design
improvement is to utilize a larger input encoding alphabet
to reduce the multi-linearity degree of the directed encoding
scheme, i.e., use fewer levels than the length of the pattern.
A naı¨ve approach to extend to a larger alphabet would
be to convert words of w bits into base-2w representation
and then generate 2w encoding matrices for each word. This
method would work for short elements ri,b, where i ∈ [L],
b ∈ {0, . . . , 2w − 1}, and L = L/w	 is the new effective
length of the pattern. However, short elements si,b, which
encode the wildcard information, need to be generated and
assigned in a more complex manner.
To keep track of bit-level wildcards, we introduce wildcard
subpatterns for each word that share the same short element
si,b. Speciﬁcally, we compute a binary mask for each word that
has the wildcard entries set to 1 and all other entries set to
0. Then for every new index b ∈ {0, . . . , 2w − 1} we perform
bitwise AND between b and the mask. If the result is 0 (all
wildcard bits in the word are set to 0), we generate a new
short element si,b. Otherwise, we reuse an existing one. The
pseudocode for this optimization is depicted in Algorithm 7
(Appendix D).
To illustrate the effect of this optimization, consider the case
of 32-bit conjunctions. The binary alphabet encoding method
requires 33 levels of directed encoding. If instead we use 8-bit
words, then the number of directed encoding levels reduces to
5. At the same time, the number of encoding matrices per level
grows from 4 for w = 1 to 512 for w = 8, which increases
the program size. Hence, there is a tradeoff between a lower
multi-linearity degree and the number of encoding matrices,
which both affect the obfuscated program size.
IV. TRAPDOOR SAMPLING
A. Overview and Motivation
The main computational bottleneck of the obfuscation pro-
cedure in the conjunction obfuscation scheme is the preimage
sampling GaussSamp. Also, the dimensions of the encoding
keys and obfuscated program matrices are determined by the
dimension of the lattice trapdoor used for preimage sampling.
Therefore, any advances in this area have a profound effect on
the performance of conjunction obfuscation and many other
program obfuscations schemes.
Our implementation uses a trapdoor sampling approach pro-
posed by Micciancio and Peikert [44] and improved/extended
trapdoor sampling algorithms recently proposed in [61]. In
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this approach, samples around a target point t in lattice Λ are
generated using an intermediate gadget lattice Gn. The lattice
Λ is ﬁrst mapped to Gn, then a Gaussian sample is generated
in Gn. The sample is then mapped back to Λ. The linear
function T mapping Gn to Λ is used as the trapdoor. The main
challenge of this approach is that the mapping T produces a
lattice point in Λ with an ellipsoidal Gaussian distribution and
covariance dependent on the transformation T . To generate
spherical samples, the authors apply a perturbation technique
that adds noise with complimentary covariance to the target
point t prior to using it as the center for Gn sampling.
From an implementation perspective, this approach decom-
poses the lattice trapdoor sampling GaussSamp procedure into
two phases: 1) a perturbation sampling stage (SamplePZ),
where target-independent perturbation vectors with a covari-
ance matrix deﬁned by the trapdoor mapping T are generated,
and 2) a target-dependent stage (SampleG) where Gaussian
samples are generated from lattice Gn. The ﬁrst phase, usually
referred to as perturbation generation [61], can be performed
ofﬂine as it does not depend on the target point t. The second
stage, referred to as G-sampling [61], is always performed
online as it depends on the target point.
The prior Gaussian sampling algorithm introduced in [44]
and improved and implemented in [62] has a high computa-
tional complexity for an arbitrary modulus (the SampleG oper-
ation requires O
(
n log3 q
)
primitive operations as compared
to O (n log q) for a power-of-two modulus). Moreover, both
variants of the algorithm have high storage requirements for a
Cholesky decomposition matrix (computed for each trapdoor
pair and used in perturbation sampling) composed of a large
number of multiprecision ﬂoating-point numbers. The above
implies that this prior Gaussian sampling approach is not prac-
tical for our implementation of the conjunction obfuscation
construction dealing with non-power-of-two moduli and m
calls to SampleG for each encoding matrix.
We implement a much more efﬁcient approach based on the
trapdoor sampling algorithms recently proposed in [61]. The
SampleG algorithm developed in [61] has O (n log q) com-
plexity for arbitrary moduli (same as for power-of-two moduli
in [44], [62]). The perturbation sampling method proposed in
[61] works with a Cholesky decomposition matrix implicitly
and does not require additional storage. Our trapdoor sampling
implementation is described in the rest of this section.
B. Trapdoor Construction and G-Lattice Representation
The concrete value of dimension m is determined by the
ring trapdoor construction chosen for the implementation. It
is common to write m = m¯ + k, where m¯ is a security
dimension and k denotes the dimension of (binary) gadget
matrix. Two ring constructions were suggested in [44] and
further developed in [62]. The ﬁrst one, where m¯ = 2 and,
therefore, m = 2 + k, is generated by drawing k samples
(a, arˆi + eˆi), where i ∈ [k], from Ring-LWE distribution. The
second construction uses m¯ uniformly random polynomials,
where m¯ is usually set to at least k. As the second construction
requires that m be at least 2k, the Ring-LWE construction
deals with a smaller dimension and is thus preferred for our
implementation.
Note that a different type of ring trapdoor construction was
proposed in [63] based on a non-standard NTRU assumption.
This construction cannot be applied to the conjunction obfus-
cator because the generated samples have a large distribution
parameter, i.e., Θ
(√
q
)
, which prevents one from using the
samples for multiplying the encodings without invalidating the
correctness.
As another major optimization of this work, we introduce
a generalized version of the Ring-LWE construction in [62],
[44]. In our implementation m = 2+κ, where κ = k/ log2 t	
and t is the base for the gadget lattice Gn (t was set to 2 in
[62]). The use of base t higher than 2 reduces the dimension
of encoding matrices, which dramatically improves all main
performance metrics of the conjunction obfuscator, as shown
in Section V. The algorithmic idea of using an arbitrary base
t was originally suggested in [44] but has not been explored
in implementations based on polynomial rings.
The pseudocode for the Ring-LWE trapdoor construction
is depicted in Algorithm 1. In the pseudocode, rˆ and eˆ
are the row vectors of secret trapdoor polynomials generated
using discrete Gaussian distribution, A is the public key, and
gT = {g1, g2, . . . , gκ} is the gadget row vector corresponding
to the gadget lattice Gn. The latter is often denoted as simply
G because it is an orthogonal sum of n copies of a low-
dimensional lattice G.
Algorithm 1 Trapdoor generation using Ring-LWE for G
lattice of base t
function TRAPGEN(1λ)
a ← Uq ∈ Rq
rˆ := [rˆ1, . . . , rˆκ] ← DR,σ ∈ R1×κq
eˆ := [eˆ1, . . . , eˆκ] ← DR,σ ∈ R1×κq
A := [a, 1, g1 − (arˆ1 + eˆ1), . . . , gκ − (arˆκ + eˆκ)] ∈
R1×(2+κ)q
return (A, (rˆ, eˆ))
end function
Although the trapdoor T in the general deﬁnition in Section
III-B has dimensions m × κ, for this construction we can
perform all computations with a compact trapdoor T˜ =
(rˆ, eˆ) ∈ Rq2×κ, as explained in Section IV-E.
C. High-Level Trapdoor Sampling Algorithm
The high-level preimage sampling algorithm adapted for our
lattice trapdoor construction is listed in Algorithm 2. It is based
on the general approach proposed in [44]. Note that we use
the distribution parameter σt, which depends on the base t of
G-lattice. The vector p is the perturbation vector required to
produce spherical samples.
Sections IV-D and IV-E describe in more detail the proce-
dures SampleG and SamplePZ , respectively.
D. Sampling G-lattices
The G-lattice sampling problem is deﬁned as the problem
of sampling the discrete Gaussian distribution on a lattice
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Algorithm 2 Gaussian preimage sampling
function GAUSSSAMP(A, T˜, b, σt, s)
for i = 0..m− 1 do
p ← SamplePZ
(
n, q, s, σt, T˜
)
∈ Rmq
z ← SampleG(σt, bi −Ap, q)
Convert z ∈ Zκ×n to zˆ ∈ Rκq
xi := [p1 + eˆzˆ, p2 + rˆzˆ, p3 + zˆ1, . . . , pm + zˆκ]
end for
return x ∈ Rqm×m
end function
coset Λ⊥v
(
gT
)
=
{
z ∈ Zκ : gT z = v mod q} , where q ≤
tκ, v ∈ Z and g = (1, t, t2, . . . , tκ−1). The G-sampling
problem is formulated here for a single integer v rather than
a n-dimensional lattice because each of the n integers can be
sampled in parallel. Our implementation of G-sampling works
with a n-dimensional lattice.
We implement a variation of the G-sampling algorithm
developed in [61], which supports arbitrary bases for G-
lattice. Our variation (depicted in Algorithm 3 of Appendix
A) relies on continuous Gaussian sampling in the internal
perturbation sampling step (in contrast to discrete Gaussian
sampling in Figure 2 of [61]), reduces the number of calls to
polynomial CRT operations, and increases opportunities for
parallel execution.
Algorithm 3 has complexity O (n log q) for an arbitrary
modulus. The main idea of the algorithm is not to sample
Λ⊥v
(
gT
)
directly, but to express the lattice basis Bq = TD
as the image (using a transformation T) of a matrix D
with a sparse, triangular structure. This technique requires
adding a perturbation with a complementary covariance to
obtain a spherical Gaussian distribution, as in the case of the
GaussSamp procedure described in Algorithm 2. In this prior
work the authors select an appropriate instantiation of D that
is sparse and triangular, and has a complementary covariance
matrix with simple Cholesky decomposition Σ2 = L · LT ,
where L is an upper triangular matrix, and ﬁnd the entries of
the L matrix in closed form.
E. Perturbation sampling
The lattice preimage sampling algorithm developed in [44]
requires the generation of nm-dimensional Gaussian perturba-
tion vectors p with covariance Σp := s2·I−σ2t
[
T I
]T ·[TT I] ,
where T ∈ Z2n×nκ is a matrix with small entries serving as
a lattice trapdoor, s is the upper bound on the spectral norm
of σt
[
TT , I
]T
.
When working with algebraic lattices, the trapdoor T can
be compactly represented by a matrix T˜ ∈ R2×κn , where n
denotes the rank (dimension) of the ring Rn. In our case, this
corresponds to the cyclotomic ring of order mˆ = 2n. For the
Ring-LWE trapdoor construction used in our implementation
(Algorithm 1), the trapdoor T˜ is computed as (rˆ, eˆ). The
main challenge with the perturbation sampling techniques
developed in [62], [44] is the direct computation of a Cholesky
decomposition of Σp that destroys the ring structure of the
compact trapdoor and operates on matrices over R.
Genise and Micciancio [61] propose an algorithm that lever-
ages the ring structure of Rn and performs all computations
either in cyclotomic rings or ﬁelds over Φ2n(x) = xn + 1.
The algorithm does not require any preprocessing/storage
and runs with time and space complexity quasi-linear in n.
The perturbation sampling algorithm can be summarized in a
modular way as a combination of three steps [61]:
1) The problem of sampling a n(2 + κ)-dimensional Gaus-
sian perturbation vector with covariance Σp is reduced to
the problem of sampling a 2n-dimensional integer vector
with covariance expressed by a 2× 2 matrix over Rn.
2) The problem of sampling with covariance in R2×2n is
reduced to sampling two n-dimensional vectors with
covariance in Rn.
3) The sampling problem with covariance in Rn is reduced
to sampling n-dimensional perturbation with covariance
expressed by a 2 × 2 matrix over the smaller ring Rn/2
using an FFT-like approach.
We implement a variation of the perturbation generation
algorithm developed in [61]. Our variation (depicted in Algo-
rithm 4 of Appendix A) reduces the number of calls to CRT
operations and increases opportunities for parallel execution.
F. Integer Gaussian Sampling
Our implementations of G-sampling and perturbation sam-
pling procedures require generating integers with Gaussian
distribution for large distribution parameters and varying
centers. For instance, the optimal values of base t lead to
distribution parameters up to 220 for G-sampling and even
larger values for perturbation generation. This implies that
conventional Gaussian sampling techniques such as the in-
version sampling developed in [64] and rejection sampling
proposed in section 4.1 of [65] are not practical for trapdoor
sampling, as described in detail in [46].
To this end, we implement two recently proposed generic
samplers: Karney’s rejection sampler [45] and constant-time
sampler [46].
The rejection sampler [45] provides a relatively low rejec-
tion rate (roughly 0.5) vs. a much higher rate in the case
of rejection sampling [65], and has no additional storage
requirements, at least when it is not separated into ofﬂine and
online stages. However, it has a relatively signiﬁcant variability
in sampling time making it prone to timing attacks.
The generic sampler [46], on the other hand, uses a constant-
time algorithm that breaks down sampling for large distribu-
tion parameters into multiple runs for much smaller distri-
bution parameters. It also utilizes multiple cosets to support
varying-center requirements, with the number of cosets being
an adjustable parameter. At the lowest level, this generic
sampler depends on the implementation of a base sampler for a
small distribution parameter and ﬁxed center, which can be re-
alized using efﬁcient Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
inversion [64] or Knuth-Yao [66] methods. This algorithm has
signiﬁcant memory requirements to store precomputed lookup
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tables/trees for the base sampler but the storage requirements
can be adjusted at the expense of increased sampling runtime.
The choice of a speciﬁc generic sampler in our experiments
is determined by minimizing the obfuscation runtime.
V. SETTING THE PARAMETERS
A. Distribution Parameters
1) Distribution Parameter for Ring-LWE Trapdoor Con-
struction: The trapdoor secret polynomials are generated using
the smoothing parameter σ estimated as σ ≈√ln(2nm/
)/π,
where nm is the maximum ring dimension and 
 is the
bound on the statistical error introduced by each randomized-
rounding operation [44]. For nm ≤ 214 and 
 ≤ 2−80, we
choose a value of σ ≈ 4.578.
2) Short Ring Elements in Directed Encoding: For short
ring elements si,b, ri,b, we use ternary uniformly random ring
elements, which are sampled over {−1, 0, 1}n. This implies
that we rely on small-secret Ring-LWE for directed encoding.
3) Distribution Parameters for Directed Encoding: To en-
code ternary random elements, we use the smoothing param-
eter σ (for the noise polynomials) deﬁned in Section V-A1.
To encode a product of ternary random ring elements
under the Ring-LWE assumption, we need to sample noise
polynomials using σ′ = ω (log λ)
√
nσ (Section 4.3 of [1]).
The term ω (log λ) guarantees that DR,√nσ+σ′ is “smudged”
by Lemma 2.4 of [1] to DR,σ′ . In our implementation, we use
a concrete estimate σ′ = k
√
nσ.
4) Distribution Parameter for G-Sampling: Our G-
sampling procedure requires that σt = (t + 1)σ. This guar-
antees that all integer sampling operations inside G-sampling
use at least the smoothing parameter σ, which is sufﬁcient
to approximate the continuous Gaussian distribution with a
negligible error.
5) Spectral norm s: Parameter s is the spectral norm
used in computing the Cholesky decomposition matrix (it
guarantees that the perturbation covariance matrix is well-
deﬁned). To bound s, we use inequality s > s1 (X)σt, where
X is a sub-Gaussian random matrix with parameter σ [44].
Lemma 2.9 of [44] states that s1 (X) ≤
C0σ
(√
nκ+
√
2n+ C1
)
, where C0 is a constant and
C1 is at most 4.7.
We can now rewrite s as s > C0σσt
(√
nκ+
√
2n+ 4.7
)
.
In our experiments we used C0 = 1.3, which was found
empirically.
B. Conjunction Obfuscator Correctness
The correctness constraint for a conjunction pattern with L
words (L ≥ 2) is expressed as
q > 192σ′
(
2s
√
mn
)L
. (1)
The correctness constraint (1), which is derived using
the Central Limit Theorem, signiﬁcantly reduces bitwidth
requirements for modulus q (as compared to the analysis
in [1] for a multi-level directed encoding scheme; note also
that no correctness constraint for conjunction obfuscator was
derived in [1]). Hence, our correctness estimate is another
major improvement in this work. The details of deriving the
correctness constraint are provided in Appendix B.
C. Security
1) Ring dimension n: We utilize Ring-LWE for the trap-
door construction and a combination of small-secret Ring-
LWE and an entropic variant of small-secret Ring-LWE for
directed encoding. Since entropic small-secret Ring-LWE is
the strongest assumption, it should determine the value of
the ring dimension n. However, no experimental results for
entropic Ring-LWE are available and hence we assume that
we can use the same lower bounds for λ as for regular (non-
entropic) Ring-LWE. As the directed encoding Ring-LWE
instance uses the ternary distribution T to generate secret
polynomials, our lower-bound estimates of the number of
security bits λ are computed for this variant of Ring-LWE.
We run the LWE security estimator2 (commit 9302d42) [67]
to ﬁnd the lowest security levels for the uSVP, decoding, and
dual attacks following the standard homomorphic encryption
security recommendations [68]. We choose the least value of λ
for all 3 attacks on classical computers based on the estimates
for the BKZ sieve reduction cost model.
2) Dimensionm: The dimensionm can be written as m¯+κ,
where m¯ is a security dimension determined by the Ring-LWE
trapdoor construction and κ is a functional parameter.
Consider the Ring-LWE construction constraint. Let us
write the public key A in Algorithm 1 as A =
[
A¯|gT − A¯R],
where A × (RI ) = gT . Here, A¯ is uniformly random and
R is small. The pseudorandomness of A =
[
A¯|gT − A¯R]
(required by our application) immediately follows from the
pseudorandomness of
[
A¯|A¯R], which is implied by the Ring-
LWE assumption.
More speciﬁcally, we use the Ring-LWE construction from
[44], [62], implying that A¯ is represented as [a, 1], i.e., a
1 × 2 matrix over the Ring-LWE ring. Then each column of
A¯R is of the form ci = arˆi + eˆi. The pseudorandomness of
(a, ci) follows from Ring-LWE. Since each ci uses a different
“secret” ri, the public value of a can be reused, and joint
pseudorandomness follows by a standard hybrid argument.
This means that the security dimension m¯ = 2, i.e., m = 2+κ,
can be used regardless of dimension κ.
3) Work factors tV BB and tRLWE: We consider two attack
models to learn the full conjunction pattern. The ﬁrst one
is based on VBB (input-output) analysis, independently of
the underlying cryptographic obfuscation construction. The
second model is based on lattice attacks on the obfuscated
program, i.e., requires solving multiple Ring-LWE problems.
We present here the attacks that result in lowest work factors
tV BB and tRLWE for the VBB and lattice models, respectively
(our analysis showed these attacks correspond to optimal lower
bounds for both models but the formal proofs are beyond the
scope of this paper). The work factors are expressed in terms of
the number of clock cycles to abstract from speciﬁc hardware
architectures.
2https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator
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VBB model. The work factor for a speciﬁc conjunction
pattern depends on the number of wildcard bits, denoted as
X . If we assume that the conjunction pattern has high entropy,
then the adversary can (on average) run 2L−X random-input
evaluation queries to ﬁnd a ﬁrst match, which is equivalent to a
point function with L−X bits. Once the ﬁrst match is found,
the adversary can run additional L evaluation queries to ﬁnd
the wildcard positions. Therefore, the VBB work factor can be
estimated as tV BB =
(
2L−X + L
)
teval ≈ 2L−Xteval, where
teval is the number of clock cycles for a single evaluation of
the obfuscated program.
Lattice model. Our most efﬁcient lattice-based attack can
be described as follows:
1) Find all wildcard positions. For each word of w bits, solve
w×2×2 = 4w Ring-LWE problems, where the ﬁrst factor
of 2 corresponds to bits 0 and 1, and the second factor of
2 corresponds to each encoding matrix for si,b · ri,b and
ri,b, respectively (both ring elements are needed to ﬁnd
si,b). This procedure is repeated for each word, i.e., L/w
times (for simplicity, we assume w|L), which implies this
step requires a work factor of 2λ+2L.
2) For each word, solve additional 2 × 2w−Xi problems to
ﬁnd all si,b, where Xi is the number of wildcards in the
i-th word. Some solutions may have already been found
in Step 1 but we can expect their contribution to be small
(to simplify the analysis). The work factor of this step is
2λ+1
∑L/w
i=1 2
w−Xi .
3) Solve Ring-LWE problems for rL+1 and rL+1
∏L
i=1 si,vi .
4) Steps 1–2 yield all values of si,b. Now compare 2L−X
products
∏L
i=1 si,b with
∏L
i=1 si,vi found in step 3. The
computation of one product
∏L
i=1 si,b requires approxi-
mately the work factor of
(
2m2
)−1
teval, as can be seen
from Algorithm 8.
The Ring-LWE work factor can then be written as
tRLWE ≈ 2λ+1
⎛⎝L/w∑
i=1
2w−Xi + 2L
⎞⎠+ 2L−Xteval
2m2
.
For conjunction obfuscation with at least 80 bits of security,
the following constraints have to be satisﬁed: tRLWE ≥
tV BB ≥ 280. Note that for a 2.5 GHz core, 280 clock cycles
correspond to 1.4× 107 core-years.
4) Small-Secret Ring-LWE vs Error-Secret Ring-LWE for
Directed Encoding: Our implementation also supports integer
Gaussian distribution DR,σ for short ring elements si,b, ri,b,
i.e., the error-secret Ring-LWE (Deﬁnition 1). This variant
increases the modulus q, more speciﬁcally the parameter Be in
expression (5), by a factor of σ
√
γ (γ is explained in Section
V-B), which is only 5 bits for our parameters.
According to our estimates using [67], error-secret and
small-secret Ring-LWE require almost the same bitwidth for
q to achieve the same level of security for practical ring
dimensions (the modulus q is at most 4 bits larger for small-
secret Ring-LWE). Hence, both small-secret and error-secret
Ring-LWE variants can be used without any major difference
in program size or runtimes (none of the performance metrics
increase by more than 15% for the error-secret case according
to our experimental analysis), achieving approximately the
same level of security according to LWE estimator [67].
We choose the small-secret Ring-LWE case for our main
experiments because it is slightly more efﬁcient than the error-
secret Ring-LWE scenario and is currently believed to be as
secure against known attacks.
D. Word Size w
The selection of word size w is governed by the tradeoff
between the decrease in multi-linearity degree (L+ 1) and
increase in the number of encoding matrices.
To ﬁnd the optimal value of w, we introduce a formal
deﬁnition of theoretical program size Σtheor (in bytes):
Σtheor (Πv) =
1
4
(2w · L+ 1) (2 + κ)2 nk. (2)
The ﬁrst multiplicand accounts for the number of encoding
matrices, the second multiplicand represents the number of
ring elements per encoding matrix, and the last term nk
deals with the storage for each ring element. This theoretical
program size is generally slightly smaller than the actual stor-
age consumed in an implementation (due to storage overhead
related to the size of underlying native integers and extra data
members in C++ classes).
We consider the program size as the main practical limita-
tion of conjunction obfuscator due to the high size estimates
(in Terabytes) listed in Tables I and II, which are found
for the G-lattice base t of 2 (larger bases are discussed in
Section V-E) and all other parameters computed using the
input parameters and constraints described in Sections V-A–
V-C. These estimates imply that w = 4 and w = 8 produce
the smallest program sizes.
In addition to obfuscated program size, we should consider
the evaluation runtime as another optimization constraint. The
evaluation runtime is proportional to L (2 + κ)2 nk, which
implies that smaller L, n, and k reduce the runtime. Therefore,
the case of w = 8 is optimal for our experiments when the
combined effect of obfuscated program size and evaluation
runtime is considered.
Tables I and II suggest that the use of w = 8 instead
of w = 1 reduces the program size by more than 2 and 3
orders of magnitude for 32-bit and 64-bit conjunction patterns,
respectively. The proportionality of evaluation runtime to
L (2 + κ)2 nk suggests that the runtime is reduced by about
4 orders of magnitude when switching from w = 1 to w = 8
both for 32-bit and 64-bit conjunction programs.
E. G-Lattice Base t
Larger values of G-lattice base t decrease the dimension
of public key A0, encoding secret keys T˜i, and encoding
matrices Ri, where i corresponds to the level of directed
encoding. More concretely, the sizes of A0, T˜i, and Ri
are proportional to (2 + κ)nk, κnk, and (2 + κ)2 nk, respec-
tively. Here, κ = k/ log2 t	 and k is the number of bits in
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TABLE I: Program size as a function of word size for 32-bit
conjunctions (with λ > 80 bits and t = 2)
w L k n Σtheor (Πv), Terabytes
1 32 1041 32768 617
2 16 505 16384 36
4 8 248 8192 5
8 4 127 4096 3
16 2 70 2048 42
32 1 45 2048 294,900
TABLE II: Program size as a function of word size for 64-bit
conjunctions (with λ > 80 bits and t = 2)
w L k n Σtheor (Πv), Terabytes
1 64 2204 65536 22,200
2 32 1049 32768 1,230
4 16 505 16384 142
8 8 248 8192 77
16 4 127 4096 792
32 2 70 2048 2,730,000
modulus q. The program size, obfuscation time, and evaluation
time are determined by the size of Ri.
When t is increased, the term (2 + κ)2 in the size of
Ri becomes smaller but the modulus bitwidth k and ring
dimension n grow as follows from expression (1) and security
analysis for n (Section V-C1). The correctness constraint (1)
suggests that q is proportional to (t+ 1)L, which means that k
grows linearly with log2 t. This implies that the size of Ri, and
hence the obfuscation program size, is always reduced with
increase in t. The maximum practical value of t is reached
when one of the following conditions is met:
1) Evaluation runtime becomes inadequately slow (as it is
proportional to kn);
2) Implementation limitations of integer Gaussian sampling
are reached, for instance, the samples start exceeding the
bitwidth of a native integer data type;
3) The value of κ reaches 2 (m = 4), which is the smallest
value supported by our perturbation sampling procedure.
It should be pointed out that the choice of t also depends
on the value of the most signiﬁcant digit of modulus q with
respect to base t, which affects the value of dκ−1 in Algorithm
3. For the worst-case analysis, assume that qκ−1 = 1, then
dκ−1 ≈ 1/t. Once this value is substituted into SampleD,
zκ−1 is sampled using a distribution parameter ≈ σt. Then the
term q0zκ−1 in the expression for t0 in SampleG may reach
values that are proportional to σt2, which are much higher
than one would expect, i.e., comparable to σt.
To avoid this scenario, we introduce an additional constraint
qκ−1/t > 1/ζ, where ζ is a constant. In our experiments, we
set ζ = 2, which implies qκ−1 has at most one bit less than t.
We also performed a combined optimization analysis for
word size w and G-lattice base t, which conﬁrmed that w = 8
is still the optimal value for t > 2.
We use the highest value of t = 220 in our experiments
due to the limitations of our implementation of Gaussian
sampling, which operates with native C++ unsigned integers,
and selected bitwidth of prime moduli in the Double-CRT
representation. If these constraints are removed, higher values
of G-lattice base t can be used.
VI. EFFICIENT MATRIX AND POLYNOMIAL ARITHMETIC
A. Matrix Chain Product in the Evaluation
The matrix chain multiplication in the evaluation operation
involves multiplications of encoding matrices of m × m by
each other, which requires a running time of O
(
m3n
)
for the
naive implementation or O
(
mlog2 7n
)
in the case of Strassen’s
algorithm. At the same time, the product of encoding matrices
is multiplied at the end by a row vector A0 ∈ Rq1×m. This
suggests that by changing the order of multiplications, we can
transform this matrix chain multiplication into a row-vector-
by-matrix chain product. Each row-vector-by-matrix product
has a running time of O
(
m2n
)
and can provide a running
time improvement by a factor of m, as compared to the
naive implementation of matrix product. This optimization is
included in Algorithm 8 listed in Appendix D. A similar idea
was used in [25], [26].
B. Efﬁcient Polynomial Arithmetic
1) Double-CRT Operations: All polynomial multiplications
are performed in the Double-CRT representation. We use the
bitwidth of 60 for each prime modulus (64-bit native unsigned
integers are leveraged for storing the numbers). This implies
a product of two polynomials with ring dimension n and
modulus q (bitwidth k) requires nk/60	 multiplications of
64-bit native integers, i.e., scales almost linearly with increase
in k. Hence, multiplications of polynomials with large k,
for example, 1000 bits, can be supported without involving
multiprecision arithmetic.
There are certain operations where we have to switch from
Double-CRT representation to a polynomial of multiprecision
integers with a large modulus q. This requires transforming
all small-modulus polynomials to the coefﬁcient representa-
tion and then performing the CRT interpolation to get large
(multiprecision) coefﬁcients of the polynomial with respect to
modulus q. This procedure is computationally expensive and
involves k/60	 NTTs followed by the CRT interpolation with
modulo reductions for every coefﬁcient with respect to q. The
two operations requiring CRT Interpolation are (1) G-sampling
where the digits of the large coefﬁcients are extracted and (2)
inﬁnity norm computation at the last stage of evaluation.
2) Number Theoretic Transform: The multiplication of ele-
ments in cyclotomic rings Rpi is performed using the Chinese
Remainder Transform (CRT) [57]. We use an implementation
of Fermat Theoretic Transform (FTT) described in [58]. We
implement FTT with Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) as
a subroutine. For NTT, we use the iterative Cooley-Tukey
algorithm with optimized butterﬂy operations, which is im-
plemented in PALISADE.
3) Cyclotomic Fields: For multiplications in K2n we use
the iterative Cooley-Tukey FTT algorithm over complex prim-
itive roots of unity.
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To convert elements of rings to ﬁelds, we switch the poly-
nomials from the evaluation representation to the coefﬁcient
one as an intermediate step because the CRTs for rings operate
with modular primitive roots of unity and CRTs for ﬁelds deal
with complex primitive roots of unity.
4) Polynomial Transposition: Element transposition for a
polynomial f(x) = f0+f1x+· · ·+fn−1xn−1 over cyclotomic
polynomial xn+1 is expressed as f t(x) = f0−fn−1x−· · ·−
f1x
n−1. This transposition technique was used for both rings
and ﬁelds. In our implementation the transposition operation
is performed directly in evaluation representation by applying
an automorphism from f(ζ2n) to f(ζ2n−12n ).
5) Modular Arithmetic: For modular reduction of multi-
precision integers (in CRT interpolation), we use a generalized
Barrett modulo reduction algorithm [69]. This approach re-
quires one pre-computation per NTT run and converts modulo
reduction to roughly two multiplications.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
A. Pseudocode of Obfuscation Scheme Algorithms
We provide pseudocode for key generation, encoding, ob-
fuscation, and evaluation of the scheme in Appendix D. The
pseudocode matches our implementation in C++.
B. Integer sampling
Both conjunction obfuscation and trapdoor sampling algo-
rithms call the integer sampling subroutine SampleZ(σ, c) that
returns a sample statistically close to DZ,c,σ. When the center
c does not change and distribution parameter is small (as in
directed encoding or Ring-LWE trapdoor construction), our
SampleZ implementation uses the inversion sampling method
developed in [64]. In all other cases (trapdoor sampling), we
use either Karney’s rejection sampler [45] or constant-time
sampler [46].
A bottleneck of integer sampling operations in lattice-
based cryptography, speciﬁcally those called in the subroutines
of GaussSamp, is the use of multiprecision ﬂoating-point
numbers where the number of bits in the mantissa should
roughly match the number of security bits supported by the
cryptographic protocol. A recent theoretical result in [46]
suggests that both the G-sampling and perturbation generation
algorithms used in our implementation can support at least
100 bits of security using double-precision ﬂoating point arith-
metic. More speciﬁcally, Lemma 3.2 in [46] states that λ/2
signiﬁcant bits in a ﬂoating-point number is sufﬁcient for λ bits
of security. This result also applies to joint (possibly depen-
dent) distributions, as in Lemma 4.3 of [46]. Because we are
not attempting to exceed 100 bits of security, the signiﬁcand
precision of 53 bits provided by IEEE 754 double-precision
ﬂoating numbers is sufﬁcient for our security target. Therefore,
our implementation of integer Gaussian sampling performs
computations on double-precision ﬂoating-point numbers.
C. Software Implementation
We implement the conjunction obfuscation scheme in PAL-
ISADE, an open-source lattice cryptography library. PAL-
ISADE uses a layered approach with four software layers, each
including a collection of C++ classes to provide encapsulation,
low inter-class coupling and high intra-class cohesion. The
software layers are as follows:
1) The cryptographic layer supports cryptographic protocols
such as homomorphic encryption schemes through calls
to lower layers.
2) The encoding layer supports plaintext encodings for cryp-
tographic schemes.
3) The lattice constructs layer supports power-of-two and
arbitrary cyclotomic rings (coefﬁcient, CRT, and double-
CRT representations). Lattice operations are decomposed
into primitive arithmetic operations on integers, vectors,
and matrices here.
4) The arithmetic layer provides basic modular operations
(multiple multiprecision and native math backends are
supported), implementations of Number-Theoretic Trans-
form (NTT), Fermat-Theoretic Transform (FTT), and
Bluestein FFT. The integer distribution samplers are
implemented in this layer.
Our conjunction obfuscation implementation is a new PAL-
ISADE module called “trapdoor”, which includes the follow-
ing new features broken down by layer:
• Conjunction obfuscation scheme in the cryptographic
layer.
• Directed encoding in the encoding layer.
• Trapdoor sampling, including Ring-LWE trapdoor gen-
eration, G-sampling and perturbation generation routines
in the lattice layer. Cyclotomic ﬁelds K2n and additional
polynomial/double-CRT operations, such as polynomial
transposition, are also in this layer.
• Generic integer Gaussian samplers and a Cooley-Tukey
transform based on complex roots of unity in the arith-
metic layer.
Several lattice-layer and arithmetic-layer optimizations are
also applied for runtimes improvements.
D. Loop parallelization
Multi-threading is performed using OpenMP3. Loop paral-
lelization is applied to parallelize obfuscation, lattice, and ma-
trix operations, and we use the following loop parallelization
optimizations:
1) In KeyGen (Algorithm 5), the loop calling TrapGen is
parallelized, with its results combined in an ordered way
into an STL vector.
2) In GaussSamp (Algorithm 2), the main loop is executed
in parallel. The loop is called by Encode, which is called
by Obfuscate. This optimization effectively achieves the
overall parallel execution of the obfuscation procedure.
3) The loops in matrix and matrix-vector multiplication are
parallelized. This optimization determines the paralleliza-
tion of Evaluate (Algorithm 8).
4) Number-theoretic transforms of matrices (vectors) of ring
elements are executed in parallel for each ring element.
3http://www.openmp.org/
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This optimization applies to key generation, obfuscation,
and evaluation operations.
5) CRT Interpolation used in G-sampling (Obfuscate) and
norm computation (Evaluate) is executed in parallel for
each coefﬁcient of the polynomial.
We discuss the effect of these optimizations in Sec. VIII-E.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Testbed
Experiments were performed using a server computing
environment with 4 sockets of Intel Xeon CPU E7-8867 v3
rated at 2.50GHz, each with 16 cores. The total number of
cores was 64 (128 logical processors). 2TB of RAM was
accessible for the experiment. The executable was run using a
docker image with Linux Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The evaluation
environment for parallelization experiments was a commodity
desktop computer with an Intel Core i7-3770 CPU with 4
cores (8 logical processors) rated at 3.40GHz and 16GB of
memory, running Linux CentOS 7. In all of our obfuscation
experiments, we selected the minimum modulus bitwidth k
that satisﬁes the correctness constraint (1) for a ring dimension
n corresponding to the chosen security level.
B. Integer Gaussian Sampling Experiments
We experimentally compared the runtimes of Karney’s
rejection method [45] with the generic sampler [46] using the
CDF inversion [64] method as the base sampler. The results are
in Appendix C. Based on this analysis, we selected Karney’s
method for our main conjunction obfuscation experiments.
C. Experiments for the Word Size of One Byte
Tables III and IV show results for the word size w of 8
bits in the server computing environment for 32-bit and 64-
bit conjunction programs, respectively. Σexp (Πv) is the actual
program size (experimentally measured as the RAM amount
used by the process after the obfuscation program is gener-
ated). These experiments were run in the multi-threaded mode
with 16 and 32 threads for 32-bit and 64-bit conjunctions,
respectively.
Tables III and IV also list the work factors (in bits of
security) for the VBB and lattice attacks, which are computed
as λV BB = log2 (tV BB) and λRLWE = log2 (tRLWE),
respectively. For 32-bit and 64-bit conjunctions, the number of
wildcard bits was set to 8 and 16, respectively. The wildcard
bits were assumed to be uniformly distributed over the words
of the pattern (2 wildcard bits per byte).
Table III suggests that lattice security parameters for 32-
bit conjunctions are sufﬁcient to match the VBB security, but
the VBB work factor for the case of n = 1024 is only 253
clock cycles, which corresponds to 39 core-days for a 2.5
GHz core. Table IV shows that the lattice attack work factor
starts exceeding the VBB work factor for 64-bit conjunctions
at n = 8192, when the VBB work factor is 273 clock cycles,
i.e., 1.1× 105 core-years.
Note that our implementation is based on the entropic Ring-
LWE problem with a small-secret (ternary) distribution, which
TABLE III: Runtimes and program size for 32-bit conjunction
programs in a server computing environment for w=8
n k log2 t λV BB / Σexp (Πv) KeyGen Obfuscate Evaluate
λRLWE (GB) (ms) (min) (ms)
1024 180 20 53/54 5.85 94 6.2 32
2048 180 15 54/56 16.4 411 17.3 60
4096 180 15 55/86 37.9 1141 36.0 117
TABLE IV: Runtimes and program size for 64-bit conjunction
programs in a server computing environment for w=8
n k log2 t λV BB / Σexp (Πv) KeyGen Obfuscate Evaluate
λRLWE (GB) (s) (hr) (s)
1024 360 20 70/60 77 0.31 0.7 0.29
2048 360 20 71/61 155 0.66 1.4 0.53
4096 360 18 72/62 374 1.58 3.3 1.06
8192 360 18 73/87 748 3.03 6.7 2.45
is a stronger assumption than Ring-LWE. While our work
factor estimates already incorporate the effect of small-secret
distribution (using the LWE estimator [67]), the effect of the
entropic variant of Ring-LWE on the work factor is currently
unknown and is thus ignored in our estimates.
As suggested in Section V-D, program size is a major
practical limitation of conjunction obfuscator. For a 64-bit
conjunction program, the experimental program size reached
750 GB. However, the program size for a 32-bit program is
small enough to be loaded into the RAM of a commodity
desktop computer.
The experimental results in Tables III and IV also demon-
strate that the key generation time is small, on the order of
one second.
The obfuscation takes 6.7 hours to achieve 73-bit security
for the 64-bit conjunction program, and is the main compu-
tational bottleneck of conjunction obfuscator. This operation
is run ofﬂine and once per program. Thus obfuscation time is
does not impact many practical settings.
Evaluation takes 32 ms to acheive 53 bits of security for a
32-bit pattern and 2.5 seconds to attain 73-bit security for a 64-
bit conjunction pattern. The evaluation time is the main online
operation and is expected to be run frequently. The 32-bit
pattern results imply that runtime is practical. Our evaluation
runtime for a 64-bit conjunction obfuscator is smaller by more
than two orders of magnitude than the time (949 sec.) reported
for a 64-bit read-once branching program obfuscated using
GGH15 in [27].
D. Experiments for the Word Size of One Bit
To explore the effect of multilinearity degree on the runtime
metrics of conjunction obfuscator, we performed a series of
experiments at w = 1 (Table V). The multinearity degree of
directed encoding corresponds to L+ 1 as we have one more
level of encoding at the end, which is speciﬁc to the test for
conjunction obfuscator.
Table V shows that our implementation is able to achieve
the multilinearity degree of 25 (in contrast to 20 in [27] for
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TABLE V: Runtimes and program size for conjunction pro-
grams at w=1, t = 220, and λ > 80
L n k Σexp (Πv) KeyGen Obfuscate Evaluate
(GB) (s) (min) (s)
5 8192 240 1.08 1.1 1.1 0.39
6 8192 300 2.36 1.7 1.8 0.72
8 16384 420 13.2 7.6 8.2 3.7
10 16384 480 28.6 11 12 5.5
12 16384 600 60.4 18 22 12
14 32768 720 227 62 103 74
16 32768 780 363 81 135 101
18 32768 900 565 115 198 158
19 32768 960 723 134 237 188
20 32768 960 825 148 252 213
21 32768 1020 994 172 310 230
22 32768 1080 1232 199 350 247
23 32768 1140 1459 212 404 286
24 32768 1200 1774 257 510 379
a comparable computing environment). For the degree of 20,
our obfuscation time is 237 minutes (vs 4,060 minutes in [27])
and our evaluation is 188 seconds (vs 1,514 seconds in [27]).
Our main experimental limitation was memory in the server
computing environment. Results in Table V show that our
implementation would be able to support at most 24-bit
conjunction programs if the word encoding optimization were
not applied. Also, the runtimes for this 24-bit scenario are
substantially higher than our results for 32-bit conjunction
programs in Table III.
E. Parallelization experiments
Table VI shows the runtime results for a 32-bit pattern with
53 bits of security on a 4-core desktop commodity CPU as a
function of the number of threads. The total program size and
all input parameters are the same as in the ﬁrst row of Table III.
As expected, runtimes for 4 and 8 threads are approximately
the same. There is no major beneﬁt of hyper-threading, as the
number of physical cores is 4.
When increasing the number of threads from 1 to 4, the
key generation time decreases by a factor of 3.2, suggesting
that key generation beneﬁts from loop parallelization. The
obfuscation procedure scales well with more threads. Runtime
improvement is a factor of 3.2 (and even 3.5 when 8 threads
are considered). This implies that further obfuscation runtime
improvements can be achieved using more CPU cores. The
evaluation procedure also beneﬁts from loop parallelization.
The runtime improvement in this case is 3.4 (3.7 for 8 threads).
The evaluation runtime of 43 ms on a commodity desktop
environment implies that a 32-bit conjunction obfuscator is
already practical.
We also ran the evaluation of an obfuscated 64-bit con-
junction program (with 73 bits of security) on the commodity
desktop computer for the scenario where the obfuscation
is previously performed in a high-performance computing
environment (corresponds to the last row in Table IV). This ﬁts
the scenario where the obfuscated program would be stored
on SSD drives (or other fast access media.) The average time
of evaluation was 3.5 sec.
TABLE VI: Runtimes for 32-bit conjunction patterns at n =
1024 as a function of number of threads in a 4-core commodity
desktop computing environment
# threads KeyGen Obfuscate Evaluate
(s) (min) (ms)
1 0.179 24.3 161
2 0.106 13.8 90
4 0.056 7.7 48
8 0.053 7.0 43
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our work presents an improved design and software imple-
mentation for the secure obfuscation of conjunction programs,
which are signiﬁcantly more complex than simple point obfus-
cation functions supported by prior obfuscation implementa-
tions. The obfuscation construction we implement is based on
a reasonable hardness variant of a standard lattice assumption
(entropic Ring-LWE) and distributional VBB, in constrast
to previous implementations of non-trivial obfuscators based
on IO via multilinear maps [25], [26], [27] or the heuristic
techniques not derived from the computational hardness of
mathematical problems [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7].
Through our optimizations, we are able to reduce the
program size, obfuscation runtime, and evaluation runtime by
multiple orders of magnitude. This allows us to execute the
obfuscation and evaluation of 32-bit conjunction programs in
a commodity desktop environment. Our implementation can
also run secure obfuscation of 64-bit conjunction programs
in a commercially available server computing environment
and execute evaluation in a commodity desktop environment,
achieving the evaluation runtime of 3.5 seconds.
A major challenge not addressed by this work is the encod-
ing of real practical programs as conjunctions chosen from a
distribution having sufﬁcient entropy. A potential approach to
this problem is to use the obfuscation technique for compute-
and-compare programs, a recently proposed generalization of
conjunction obfuscators, based on LWE [50]. Note that many
design elements and optimizations presented in this study can
also be applied to this more general obfuscation technique.
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APPENDIX A
PSEUDOCODE FOR TRAPDOOR SAMPLING ALGORITHMS
Algorithm 3 G-sampling [61]
function SAMPLEG(σt, u,q)  q = [q]
κ
t is the vector of
base-t digits in modulus q
σ := σt/ (t+ 1)
l0 :=
√
t (1 + 1/κ) + 1
h0 := 0
d0 := q0/t
for i = 1..κ− 1 do
li :=
√
t (1 + 1/(κ− i))  li, hi are entries in
sparse triangular matrix L
hi :=
√
t (1− 1/ {κ− (i− 1)})
di := (di−1 + qi) /t  di are entries in the last
column of matrix D
end for
Define Z ∈ Zκ×n  this vector will store the result
of G-sampling
for i = 0..n− 1 do  Iterate through all coefﬁcients of
polynomial. This loop can be parallelized.
v := u(i)  v = [v]
κ
t is the vector of digits in
coefﬁcient u(i) ∈ Zq
p ← PERTURB(σ, l,h)  p, l,h ∈ Rκ
c0 := (v0 − p0)/t
for j = 1..κ− 1 do
cj = (cj−1 + vj − pj)/t
end for
z ← SAMPLED(σ, c,d)  z ∈ Zκ; c,d ∈ Rκ
t0 := t · z0 + q0 · zκ−1 + v0
for j = 1..κ− 2 do
tj := t · zj − zj−1 + qj · zκ−1 + vj
end for
tκ−1 := qκ−1 · zκ−1 − zκ−2 + vκ−1
Z(:, i) := t  t = (t0, t1, . . . , tκ−1) ∈ Zκ
end for
return Z
end function
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The algorithms described in this section are variations of
trapdoor sampling algorithms proposed in [61]. The modiﬁca-
tions were made to reduce the number of calls to polynomial
CRT operations, increase opportunities for parallel execution,
and ease the software implementation.
A more signiﬁcant modiﬁcation is in the Perturb subroutine
of Algorithm 3. Instead of using discrete Gaussian distribution,
we switched to the continuous distribution. The use of discrete
Gaussian distribution would require a higher value of σt,
proportional to t2 rather than t + 1, due to the Σ3 condition
in Corrolary 3.1 of [61]. This would signiﬁcantly increase the
modulus q (for large t) determined by the correctness con-
straint (1). The use of the continuous distribution eliminates
the Σ3 condition. A more detailed discussion of this scenario
is provided after Corrolary 3.1 in [61].
function PERTURB(σ, l,h)  l,h ∈ Rκ are the entries in
matrix L
for i = 0..κ− 1 do
zi ← SAMPLER(σ, 0)  SAMPLER is continuous
Gaussian sampler
end for
for i = 0..κ− 2 do
pi = li · zi + hi+1 · zi+1
end for
pκ−1 = hκ−1 · zκ−1
return p  p = (p0, p1, . . . , pκ−1) ∈ Rκ
end function
function SAMPLED(σ, c,d)  Sample from the lattice
generated by matrix D
zκ−1 ← SAMPLEZ(σ/dκ−1,−cκ−1/dκ−1)
c := c− zκ−1d
for i = 0..κ− 2 do
zi ← SAMPLEZ(σ,−ci)
end for
return z  z = (z0, z1, . . . , zκ−1) ∈ Zκ
end function
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF CORRECTNESS CONSTRAINT FOR
CONJUNCTION OBFUSCATOR
Consider initially the case of a 2-word conjunction obfus-
cation pattern, where we use R1, R2, and R3 to denote the
encoding matrices and A0, A1, A2, and A3 to denote the
public keys. The Encode operation for the ﬁrst level can then
be expressed as
A0R1 = r1A1 + e1 ∈ R1×mq ,
where r1 is a product of two uniform ring elements sampled
over {−1, 0, 1}n,A0 ∈ R1×mq , and R1 ∈ Rm×mq .
Algorithm 4 Perturbation generation [61]
function SAMPLEPZ(n, q, s, σt, (rˆ, eˆ) )
z :=
(
σ−2t − s−2
)−1
a := s2 − z∑κi=1 rˆTi rˆi  a ∈ K2n
b := −z∑κi=1 rˆTi eˆi  b ∈ K2n
d := s2 − z∑κi=1 eˆTi eˆi  d ∈ K2n
for i = 0..nκ− 1 do
qi ← SAMPLEZ(
√
s2 − σ2t )
end for
convert q ∈ Zκ×n to qˆ ∈ Rκq  CRT operations
can be executed in parallel
c := − σ2t
s2−σ2t
[
rˆ
eˆ
]
qˆ  c ∈ K22n
p ← SAMPLE2Z (a, b, d, c)  p ∈ Z2×n
convert p ∈ Z2×n to pˆ ∈ R2q
return (pˆ, qˆ)
end function
function SAMPLE2Z(a, b, d, c )
let c = (c0, c1)
q1 ← SAMPLEFZ(d, c1)  q1 ∈ Zn
convert q1 ∈ Zn to qˆ1 ∈ K2n
c0 := c0 + bd
−1 (qˆ1 − c1)
q0 ← SAMPLEFZ(a− bd−1bT , c0)  q0 ∈ Zn
return (q0, q1)
end function
The expression corresponding to the minuend in Evaluate,
i.e., A0SΠR3, can be written as follows:
A0R1R2R3 = (r1A1 + e1)R2R3 =
(r1 (r2A2 + e2) + e1R2)R3 =
(r1 (r2 (r3A3 + e3) + e2R3) + e1R2R3) .
Switching to inﬁnity norms, we get the following expression
for the noise norm:
‖A0R1R2R3 − r1r2r3A3‖∞ =
‖e1R2R3 + r1e2R3 + r1r2e3‖∞ .
For the subtrahend in Evaluate, i.e., A0RΠS3, we can use
the same estimate as an upper bound for the noise. The term
function SAMPLEFZ(f, c )
if dim(f) = 1 then return SAMPLEZ
(√
f, c
)
else
let f(x) = f0(x2) + x · f1(x2)  Extract even
and odd componets of f(x)
c′ := Pstride(c)  Pstride permutes coefﬁcients
(a0, a1, . . . , an−1) to (a0, a2, . . . , an−2, a1, a3, . . . , an−1)
(q0, q1) ← SAMPLE2Z (f0, f1, f0, c′)
let q(x) = q0(x2) + x · q1(x2)
return q
end if
end function
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r1r2r3A3 is present in both terms in Evaluate by the deﬁni-
tion of conjunction obfuscator (r1r2r3A3 gets eliminated by
the subtraction in Evaluate). The actual norm of noise terms
will be signiﬁcantly smaller in this case because Gaussian
polynomials are sampled using the distribution parameter σ
rather than a much larger σ′.
Hence, the norm for a 2-word obfuscated conjunction pat-
tern can be bounded as
Δ˜ < 2 ‖e1R2R3 + r1e2R3 + r1r2e3‖∞ .
The encoding matrix Ri contains m rows with inﬁnity
norm BR = βs (for the initial encoding matrix before any
multiplications of encodings), where β = 2.0 (was found
empirically).
As ‖Ri‖∞  ri, we have
Δ˜ < 4 ‖e1R2R3‖∞ . (3)
Parameter Be is introduced as an upper bound for the
values generated using discrete Gaussian distribution and can
be taken as σ′
√
γ, where assurance measure γ can be found
empirically (usually between 36 and 144; we set γ := 36 in
our experiments).
If we consider a product of R2 and R3, we obtain
‖R×‖∞ = ‖R2R3‖∞ ≤ nmB2R.
Now consider the product of e1 and R×:
‖e1R×‖∞ ≤ nmBe ‖R×‖∞ ≤ (nm)2BeB2R.
As e1, R1, and R2 are generated using zero-centered
Gaussian sampling and the number of samples involved in
each polynomial multiplication is relatively large, we can
apply the Central Limit Theorem to replace every instance
of nm with
√
nm, which yields
‖e1R×‖∞ ≤ nmBeB2R. (4)
Applying the EqualTest condition (Δ < q/8) and substi-
tuting (4) into (3), we obtain a correctness constraint for a
2-word conjunction obfuscator:
q > 32
√
mnBe
√
mnB2R = 32Be
(√
mnBR
)2
.
Using the 2-word conjunction correctness constraint as the
base case, we can derive by induction the following expression
for an L-word conjunction:
q > 32Be
(√
mnBR
)L
(5)
for L ≥ 2.
APPENDIX C
COMPARISON OF INTEGER GAUSSIAN SAMPLERS
Table VII shows the comparison of sampling rates for
generic integer Gaussian samplers in the desktop computing
environment for the case of single-threaded execution. The
distribution parameter σ was varied from 217 to 227 to cover
the range of distribution parameters used by the subroutines
of the G-sampling and perturbation generation procedures
TABLE VII: Sampliing rates in 106 per second for generic
integer Gaussian samplers
σ Rejection sampling [65] Karney [45] Constant-time [46]
217 0.929 3.810 1.587
222 0.932 3.811 1.502
227 0.900 3.798 1.507
in trapdoor sampling for the conjunction obfuscator. These
results were used to select the generic sampler for our main
obfuscation experiments. The rejection sampling method [65]
is included only for reference. Up to 20 MB of memory was
allowed for the generic constant-time sampler [46]. The other
two methods do not have any signiﬁcant memory require-
ments.
Table VII suggests that Karney’s method [45] has the
highest sampling rate for the distribution parameter range of
interest and was thus chosen for our main obfuscation experi-
ments. The sampling rates shown in Table VII are within 20%
of the corresponding rates reported in [46], which suggests
that our conclusions are not speciﬁc to our implementation
but reﬂect the computational complexity at the algorithmtic
level.
It should be noted that both constant-time sampler [46]
and Karney’s method [45] can be separated into ofﬂine and
online subroutines. The analysis presented in [46] suggests
that the constant-time sampler [46] may be faster in this
case. Since the generic integer sampling method is used only
in the obfuscation procedure, which is executed ofﬂine, this
additional complexity is not needed for our application.
Despite a higher runtime, a constant-time sampler, such as
[46], could be preferred in practice over a rejection sampler,
like [45], because it reduces the opportunities for timing
attacks.
APPENDIX D
PSEUDOCODE FOR CONJUNCTION OBFUSCATION
ALGORITHMS
When the ring instantiation of directed encoding (described
in section III-B) is applied to the conjunction obfuscator, the
encodings Ri,b,Si,b,RL+1,SL+1 get represented as matrices
of m×m ring elements over Rq .
The key generation algorithm for the ring instantiation of
conjunction obfuscator is listed in Algorithm 5. Parameter L
is the effective length of conjunction pattern.
Algorithm 5 Key generation
function KEYGEN(1λ)
for i = 0..L+1 do
Ai, T˜i := TRAPGEN(1λ)
end for
return KL+1 :=
(
{Ai, T˜i}i∈{0,..,L+1}
)
end function
The conjunction obfuscator relies on the Encode algorithm
of directed-encoding ring instantiation (deﬁned in Section
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III-B) to encode each part of the conjunction pattern. The
Encode algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Directed encoding
function EncodeAi→Ai+1 (Ti, r, σ)
ei+1 ← DR,σ ∈ Rq1×m.
bi+1 := rAi+1 + ei+1 ∈ R1×mq
Ri+1 := GaussSamp(Ai,Ti,bi+1, σt, s) ∈ Rm×mq
return Ri+1
end function
Algorithm 7 lists the pseudocode for the main obfuscation
function. In contrast to the obfuscated program deﬁned in
Section III-A, we encode words of conjunction pattern v ∈
{0, 1, }L. Each word is w bits long, and 2w is the number of
encoding matrices for each encoded word of the pattern. The
actual pattern length L gets replaced with the effective length
L = L/w	 to reduce the number of encoding levels (multl-
inearity degree). The word encoding is a major optimization
proposed in this work, and is discussed in detail in Section
III-C.
The si,b, ri,b elements are ternary uniformly random ring
elements, i.e., sampled over {−1, 0, 1}n, for i ∈ [L] and b ∈
{0, . . . , 2w − 1}. We set si,b = · · · = si,j for indices b, · · · , j
corresponding to the same wildcard subpattern. To implement
these wildcard subpatterns, we rely on binary masks, where
the subpattern with all zeros in the wildcard characters is used
to generate a uniformly random ring element, which is then
reused for all subpatterns with non-zero bits in the wildcard
characters.
The obfuscated program then transforms to
Πv :=
(
A0, {Si,b,Ri,b}i∈[L],b∈{0,...,2w−1} ,RL+1,SL+1
)
.
Algorithm 7 operates with two variants of Encode dis-
tinguished by the distribution parameter used. To encode
ring elements ri,b and s×, we sample using σ. To encode
ring elements si,b · ri,b and rL+1, we use σ′ = k
√
nσ.
We need to use a larger value of distribution parameter in
order to apply the Ring-LWE assumption to “secret” ring
elements si,b · ri,b in the security proof for the ring variant
of directed encoding speciﬁc to conjunction obfuscator, which
is presented in section 4.3 of [1].
Note that the security proof presented in Section 4.3 of [1]
has typos in expression (1) and Hybrid 1 distribution. The
vectors e′0 and e
′
1 should be sampled from DRm,σ′ rather than
DRm,σ (here, we use the notation of [1]). This typo does not
affect the rest of Hybrid distributions and the correctness of
the proof itself.
The use of ternary distribution T implies that we rely on a
small-secret variant of the Ring-LWE assumption to minimize
the noise growth.
The pseudocode for the optimized evaluation procedure
is presented in Algorithm 8 (optimization is described in
VI-A). Just like in the abstract algorithm described in section
III-A, if both SΠ and RΠ are the encodings of the same
Algorithm 7 Obfuscation
function OBFUSCATE(v ∈ {0, 1, ∗}L,KL+1, σ, σ′)
{ri,b}i∈[L],b∈{0,...,2w−1} ← T
for i = 1..L do
Build binary wildcard mask M
for b = 0..2w-1 do
if (b ∧M) = 0 then
si,b ← T
else
j := b ∧ ¬M
si,b := si,j
end if
end for
end for
for i = 1..L do
for b = 0..2w-1 do
Si,b := EncodeAi−1→Ai(T˜i−1, si,b · ri,b, σ′)
Ri,b := EncodeAi−1→Ai(T˜i−1, ri,b, σ)
end for
end for
rL+1 ← T ∈ R
s× := rL+1
∏L
i=1 si,v[1+(i−1)w : iw]
SL+1 := EncodeAL→AL+1(T˜L, s×, σ)
RL+1 := EncodeAL→AL+1(T˜L, rL+1, σ
′)
Πv :=
(
A0, {Si,b,Ri,b}i∈[L],b∈{0,...,2w−1} ,RL+1,SL+1
)
return Πv
end function
Algorithm 8 Optimized Evaluation
function EVALUATE(x ∈ {0, 1}L, Πv)
SΠ := A0 ∈ Rq1×m
RΠ := A0 ∈ Rq1×m
for i = 1..L do
SΠ := SΠSi,x[1+(i−1)w : iw] ∈ Rq1×m
RΠ := RΠRi,x[1+(i−1)w : iw] ∈ Rq1×m
end for
Δ := ‖SΠRL+1 −RΠSL+1‖∞
return Δ ≤ q/8
end function
value, the result of Fv is 1. Otherwise, the result is 0.
The inﬁnity norm computation ﬁnds a coefﬁcient with the
maximum absolute value in the row vector of ring elements
A0 (SΠRL+1 −RΠSL+1) ∈ Rq1×m. The inequality Δ ≤
q/8 comes directly from EqualTest in the ring instantiation
of directed encoding (Section III-B).
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